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We show that recent attempts to reorganise and cut costs in the Norwegian health care and 
social services sectors have had the unintended side effects of raising the level of sickness ab-
sence and disability among the employees, and that these effects have persisted several years 
after completion of the reorganisation processes. Since a substantial proportion of the result-
ing costs are external to the decision-makers, we suspect that the pace of change may have 
been excessively high. Changes that were efficient from each service provider’s point of view 
may have been inefficient from a social and a public-finance point of view.  
    3
1  Introduction 
During the period from the early 1990’s to 2003, Norway experienced a remarkable increase 
in sickness absence and health-related withdrawals from the labour market. The average num-
ber of sickness days paid for by the Social Security Administration increased by 75 per cent, 
from a low of eight days per worker in 1994 to 14 in 2003; see Figure 1, panel (a). And the 
rate at which new workers embarked upon absence spells that turned out to entail long-lasting 
Social Security dependence (for more than six months) increased at a similar pace, from two 
per cent of the labour force in 1994 to just above three per cent in 2000 (Fevang et al., 2004). 
Many of these spells ended in permanent disability. Hence, the number of disability pension-
ers also rose sharply, from around 236,000 in the early 1990’s to 301,000 by the end of 2003.  
Policy makers are concerned that this development is somehow related to the advent 
of more ‘brutal’ work-environments, with fiercer competition, faster structural change, and 
increasing pressures towards individual adaptability. The pace of structural change has clearly 
increased in sectors of the economy that were previously sheltered against competition, such 
as public utilities, telecommunications, postal services, health care and social services. There 
are also indications that the general levels of downsizing and turnover have risen, see Figure 
1, panel (c) and (d). In particular, firms’ downsizing propensity has increased sharply after 
1995, despite general improvements in the business cycle, see panel (b). The rise in turnover 
rates is a more predictable consequence of the cyclical developments. However, Dale-Olsen 
(2005) shows, on the basis of micro firm data, that even after controlling for business cycles 
(and changes in industry composition) the turnover rate in Norwegian firms displayed a sig-
nificant positive trend during 1990-2002.
1  
- Figure 1 around here - 
                                                 
1 There is clearly also a business cycle pattern in the sickness absence behaviour, but existing evidence 
(Nordberg and Røed, 2003; Askildsen et al., 2005) indicate that this relationship is not very strong. And business 
cycle effects can obviously not explain the rise in absenteeism that occurred after the cyclical peak in 1998.    4
A more turbulent labour market may have raised the risk of work-related health im-
pairments, and also made it more difficult for employees to be present at work with given  
health problems. As we show in the next section, there is some international evidence sug-
gesting that large organisational changes sometimes do have adverse health consequences. 
According to the influential demand-control theory (Karasek, 1979; Karasek and Theorell, 
1990), most work-related adverse reactions of psychological strain (fatigue, anxiety, depres-
sion, and physical illness) occur when the psychological demands of the job are high while 
the worker’s decision latitude in the task is low. It is conceivable that enforced organisational 
changes involving downsizing of the staff increase the risk of such reactions, particularly at 
workplaces previously sheltered from competitive pressures. In Norway, as well as in other 
welfare state economies, there has been a recent drive towards making the public sector more 
efficient, and large organisational changes have been implemented to achieve this aim. Given 
the strong employment protection in this sector, it is a worry that publicly financed sickness 
and disability insurance (and ‘voluntary’ withdrawals from the labour force) sometimes serves 
as a substitute for layoff. Since the resulting transfer costs are external to the employer-
employee pair, organisational changes may be implemented even when they are inefficient 
from both a social and a public finance point of view.
2 
The present paper examines the relationship between organisational change, absentee-
ism, and welfare dependency within the public sector. It focuses on a group of workers that 
was subject to substantial workplace turbulence during the 1990’s, namely nurses working in 
hospitals, psychiatric institutions, nursing homes and community nursing.
3 Our empirical ba-
                                                 
2 The sickness insurance system in Norway is universal, and provides a 100 per cent compensation rate 
for one year, and a substantially lower rehabilitation or disability benefit thereafter. Apart from the first 16 days 
of absence (which are covered by the employer), the costs are paid for in full by the Social Security administra-
tion. There is no experience rating. 
3 In a recent sample survey among doctors and nurses in the Norwegian hospital sector (Sørensen and 
Grimsmo, 2004), as much as 59 per cent of the respondents agreed to the statement that during the past few 
years, considerations regarding the unit’s economic result had become a more important factor in their daily 
work (compared to 4 per cent who claimed it had become less important). A similar fraction of 54 per cent felt   5
sis is the municipalities’ and counties’ own employment registers for the 1992-2000 period. 
These registers confirm that the pace of organisational change has increased somewhat in the 
health care and social services sector. Despite a rather strong overall employment growth (the 
total number of man-years in the sector rose by 23.8 per cent from 1992 to 2000), we find that 
the fraction of nurses who experienced an episode of large downsizing at their own workplace 
(encompassing at least 20 per cent of the man-years) increased from an average of around 2.5 
per cent per year in 1992-1995 to 3.2 per cent in 1996-2000 (the turnover rate increased at the 
same time from 11.4 to 14.0 per cent). An important distinguishing feature of downsizings in 
this part of the economy is that they typically occur without layoffs. What usually happens is 
that redundant (permanent contract) employees are offered alternative employment opportuni-
ties within the municipality/county. Hence, the topic addressed in this paper is not the impact 
of individual displacement, but rather the consequences of being subject to a substantial or-
ganisational change, possibly involving transfer to a new workplace. Our key idea is to use 
observed organisational changes, as they materialised in downsizing and/or large staff reshuf-
fling, together with longitudinal data on the employees’ individual work histories, to identify 
the causal effects of organisational change on the workers’ concurrent absence behaviour and 
subsequent employment and welfare dependency patterns.  
Based on the population of employed nurses in October 1992, we set up a competing 
risks mixed proportional hazards (MPH) model that facilitate an analysis of how workplace 
events affect employee behaviour in terms of transitions between presence and absence, be-
tween different jobs, and from a job to welfare dependency or unsubsidised non-employment. 
To make this possible, we have merged the employers’ employment registers with various 
public administrative registers for the same period, covering all kinds of public transfers to 
                                                                                                                                                         
that working speed had become a more important factor than before. In another study among community nurses 
and home aids (Andersen and Eidset, 2003), 57 per cent of the respondents claimed that strains resulting from 
time pressure had increased during the past two years (compared to 6 per cent who claimed it had been reduced). 
In comparison, only 24 per cent felt that the physical strain had increased over the same period.   6
individuals (sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, social assistance, rehabilitation bene-
fits, and disability benefits). The statistical model we use imposes a minimum of unjustified 
parametric restrictions. The various selection processes, including selection into the initial 
state, are modelled by means of the non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE), 
which approximates the unknown distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in terms of a joint 
discrete distribution with an (a priori) unknown number of support points.  
Our main finding is that major reorganisations do cause higher rates of absence and 
welfare dependency. Nurses employed at workplaces subject to large downsizing and/or sub-
stantial changes in the composition of their staff, experienced significantly higher rates of 
long-term sickness absence than nurses who worked in more stable economic environments. 
More seriously, they also experienced higher rates of entry into more lasting forms of Social 
Security dependency, such as rehabilitation and disability benefits. In addition, they had a 
significantly higher exit rate out the labour market without any form of income support. The 
paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a brief review of the existing litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 introduces the statistical model. Section 5 pre-
sents the results, Section 6 discusses some policy implications, and Section 7 concludes. 
2  Existing Evidence 
There is an extensive international economics literature regarding individual costs of dis-
placement; for overviews, see, e.g., Hamermesh (1987), Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002). The 
main conclusion arising from this literature is that the costs associated with involuntary job 
loss are large and persistent, both in terms of subsequent income and employment propensity. 
A recent Norwegian study (Huttunen et al., 2005) finds that displacement of male workers in 
the manufacturing industries raises the probability of permanent exit from the labour market 
substantially. While 18 per cent of the displaced workers in that study had left the labour force 
seven years after the occurrence of displacement, this was the case for only 8 per cent of the   7
control group with similar non-displaced workers. We have found no empirical evidence in 
the economics literature regarding the impact of organisational changes and increased job in-
security on individuals who do not themselves become displaced.  
  There is, however, a relatively large literature within epidemiological research, sug-
gesting that major organisational changes sometimes affect the employees’ health adversely, 
in terms of increased risks of cardiovascular diseases, musculoskeletal diseases, and minor 
psychiatric morbidity; see, e.g., Ferrie (2001) and Sverke et al. (2002) for recent surveys of 
the literature, and Burke and Greenglass (2000), Burke (2003), Brown et al. (2003) and She-
ward et al. (2005) for direct evidence regarding the health care and nursing sectors. These ef-
fects are not necessarily limited to increased job insecurity in the sense of layoff, but may in-
clude the loss of any valued condition of employment. Since data opportunities for identifying 
causal effects of this kind are rare (due to the large selection problems involved), most of the 
existing (reliable) research contributions have taken advantage of a relatively small number of 
‘quasi-natural’ experiments. The most famous of these is the Whitehall II study (Ferrie et al., 
1995; 1998a; 1998b; Ferrie et al., 2002). In 1988, a large reform process was initiated in the 
British civil service, which, for some departments involved a period of substantial uncertainty. 
One of the departments was later privatised. The evidence gathered from this ‘experiment’ 
shows that the civil servants who were subject to job insecurity during this process experi-
enced adverse health effects, both in terms of self-rated health measures and clinical symp-
toms. And the members of the department under direct threat of job loss due to privatisation 
went from a position of advantage or no difference in health status (prior to the ‘announce-
ment’ of the threat) to a significant disadvantage. Similar results are gathered from a number 
of Finnish municipalities, which during the large recession in the 1990’s, to varying degrees 
went through downsizing processes (Vahtera et al.., 2000; Kivimäki et al., 2000; Kivimäki et   8
al., 2001; Vahtera et al., 2004). Downsizing turned out to be a risk factor for cardiovascular as 
well as musculoskeletal diseases, even for individuals who remained in employment.   
Although there seems to be a negative causal relationship between job insecurity and 
health, it is not obvious that increased job insecurity leads to higher rates of sickness absence. 
The reason for this ambiguity is that job insecurity also acts as a disciplinary device, such that 
more insecurity yields less absence for a given health condition. According to the Finnish evi-
dence, there is a significant positive association between the degree of downsizing and sick-
ness absence among permanent employees, but not among temporary employees (Vahtera et 
al., 2004). Hence, if the threat of direct job loss is sufficiently large, the disciplinary effects 
may neutralise or dominate the health effects. The Whitehall study also offers some evidence 
in that direction. Individuals affected by general organisational changes were subject to a rise 
in sickness absence, while individuals facing imminent privatisation of their department were 
subject to a decline (Ferrie, 2001).   
3  The Data: Employment, Welfare Dependency, and Workplace Charac-
teristics 
The population under study in this paper comprises certified nurses in Norway who were em-
ployed by a Norwegian municipality (home or community nursing) or county (hospitals, psy-
chiatric institutions), and did not receive any form of public income support (except parental 
leave or sickness benefits) by the end of October 1992 and who were below 53 years of age at 
that time. The data cover all municipalities and counties in Norway, except the Capital of 
Oslo, and include all permanent contract employees. Starting in October 1992, these individu-
als are monitored month by month during the subsequent eight years. Descriptive statistics are 
provided in Table 1. There are 43,167 individuals included in the analysis, of which more 
than 95 per cent are women. Half of the nurses are trained; i.e., they have at least three years   9
of College education, the other half are enrolled nurses, with vocational high-school educa-
tion. Part I of Table 1 depicts the distribution of labour market positions at the time of sam-
pling. All individuals are employed at this point (as a matter of data selection criterion), but 
the average number of contracted working hours is only 74% of the full-time equivalent.
4 
Among young nurses, there is also a substantial absence due to parental leave. Absence due to 
long-term sickness (more than 16 working days) is around five per cent for the remaining 
trained nurses, and seven per cent for enrolled nurses. Part II of the table depicts the distribu-
tion of labour market states for the same group of individuals exactly eight years later. More 
than 80 per cent of the nurses are still in self-supporting work and most of them remain em-
ployed in health care or social services. However, particularly among the nurses who stayed 
on in these sectors, there is a sizable fraction of long-term sickness absence in 2000 (9.2 per 
cent). The absence level is much lower among nurses who switched to another sector of the 
economy (5.3 per cent). A point to note is that this does not seem to be explained by non-
random selection; on the contrary, nurses who left had on average a higher level of sickness 
absence back in 1992 than those who remained in the health care or social services sectors 
(not shown in the table). 
- Table 1 around here - 
As indicated in the last row of Table 1, 16.9 per cent of the individuals in our sample 
received some kind of income support from the Social Security system by the end of October 
2000. Approximately half of them (8.8 per cent) received a lasting benefit, i.e., a disability 
pension or a rehabilitation transfer. Layoff seems to be a rare event among nurses in the pub-
lic sector, and only two out of thousand nurses claimed unemployment benefits.  
The overall rates of welfare dependency were much higher for enrolled nurses (21 per 
cent) than for trained nurses (12 per cent). Figure 2 provides a summary description of how 
                                                 
4 Actual working hours are higher because some nurses work more than contracted hours or have more 
than one job.   10
these fractions evolved over time for our analysis population. Since we have conditioned on 
participation in the labour force to start with, and since the average age of the analysis popula-
tion increases with calendar time, there is of course no surprise that these curves indicate ris-
ing social security dependence. The rate of increase seems to be relatively stable over time, 
but with a strong seasonal pattern (the seasonality is primarily in sickness absence). 
- Figure 2 around here - 
  By merging the event histories of the individuals with other administrative registers, 
we have been able to extract information about the workplaces and the municipalities/counties 
responsible for running them.  In the remainder of this section, we discuss some features of 
these data that are of interest with respect to identifying the causal impact of organisational 
change on individuals’ absence and exit behaviour. A full list of the explanatory variables that 
we actually use in the paper is presented in the next section, after we have set up the statistical 
model.  
Our key indicators for organisational change at workplaces are incidences of large ob-
served changes in the overall number of nursing man-years and (with some reservations ex-
plained below) large turnover of the nursing staff. These variables are both calculated from 
employment records in October each year. Let njs be the number of nurses at workplace j by 
the end of October in year s, and let  js n be the corresponding total number of man-years (the 
full-time equivalent of njs).
5 Furthermore, let injs be the number of new nurses in year s (those 
who were not employed at the workplace in year s-1) and let outjs be the number of nurses 
who have left the workplace (those who were employed in year s-1, but not in s). We then de-
fine employment growth in year s as  11 () / js js js nn n − − − and turnover (reshuffling) as 
1 min( , )/ js js js in out n − . In the empirical analysis, we are particularly concerned with the im-
                                                 
5 A ‘workplace’ is typically a service institution, such as a hospital or a nursing home. Community nurs-
ing is defined as one workplace for each of the 434 municipalities.   11
pacts of organisational changes that involve a substantive element of downsizing. Despite the 
relatively strong growth in the hospital and nursing sectors from 1992 to 2000 (2.7 per cent 
growth in the number of man-years per year), a number of workplaces reduced their staff, and 
as much as 14 per cent of the nurses in our study experienced that their workplace was down-
sized with more than 20 per cent of the man-years (36 per cent experienced downsizing of 
more than 10 per cent). Downsizing within nursing homes and community nursing was typi-
cally linked to a substantial reduction in the municipality’s entire nursing staff, indicating that 
these organisational changes were driven by the need to cut overall costs in the municipality. 
Downsizing within hospitals and psychiatric institutions, on the other hand, were to a much 
larger extent driven by re-allocation of the jobs; in the hospital sector from small (and local) 
to large hospitals, and in the psychiatry sector from institutions to outpatient clinics. 
While we consider changes in the overall number of nursing man-years to be exoge-
nous with respect to the employment behaviour of each nurse, this is obviously not the case 
for the turnover variable (since each nurse affects turnover through own quit behaviour). In 
the statistical model, we handle this problem by restricting our indicator of large turnover to 
affect individual behaviour with a time lag. Large turnover does clearly not always reflect or-
ganisational changes; it may result from any source of employee dissatisfaction and/or from 
particularly good alternative employment opportunities.  
Organisational changes at a workplace do not necessarily materialise in immediate and 
visible changes in its staffing. In the hospital sector, for example, we suspect that increased 
competitive pressures were generated by a reform in the hospital financing system, from fully 
exogenous budgets to gradually increasing elements of the pay-per-treatment principle. The 
reform was introduced in July 1997 in 15 of Norway’s 19 counties (covering 75 per cent of 
the hospital-based nurses in our data). The remaining four counties followed suit, two of them 
already in January 1998 (raising the level of affected hospital nurses to 92 per cent), one in   12
January 1999 (raising it to 97 per cent), and the last one in January 2000. The aim of the re-
form was primarily to provide incentives for increased output (such as more surgical opera-
tions), and not to cut public health spending; hence, it did typically not result in downsizing. 
Since the reform was implemented in a staggered fashion, it is possible to identify its causal 
effect on sickness absence and welfare dependency, without relying on calendar time or fixed 
county differences, provided that the staggered introduction was exogenous. A possible rea-
son for suspecting endogenous introduction is that counties with highly efficient hospitals had 
stronger incentives to implement the reform quickly than counties with less efficient hospitals. 
However, a recent study of technical efficiency in the Norwegian hospital sector found that 
there were no ex ante differences in efficiency between the early and late implementers of the 
reform (Biørn et al., 2003, p. 281). The main reason why some counties decided to wait was 
that they wanted more discretionary control over medical priorities.  
It is likely that many organisational changes have been implemented throughout the 
municipalities and counties in Norway that we are unable to observe. We expect that the gen-
eral pressure towards change has been stronger the more severe has been the local financial 
strain. We have collected data from the municipalities/counties yearly accounts, such as aver-
age income per inhabitant, changes in gross yearly incomes, and the debt/income ratio. Unfor-
tunately, these indicators of economic vigour are not as good as we would have liked. The 
reason for this is that we do not observe the economic needs in each municipality/county, and, 
since it is a stated aim of the income allocation system to provide equal standards across the 
whole country it is likely that variation in incomes to a large extent reflect variation in needs. 
There is, however, a small, but interesting source of municipality income that we consider to 
be exogenous, i.e., revenues generated from local natural resources (hydro power stations). 
Only a handful of municipalities have had the fortune of having these resources within their 
borders, but these municipalities are generally viewed as being extremely rich. For historical   13
reasons, they have succeeded in keeping these ‘windfall’ gains out of the generally redistribu-
tive income system for Norwegian municipalities. The information that can be extracted from 
them in the present context is admittedly limited, however, since they are few and relatively 
small, and, employ only 0.6 per cent of the nurses in our study (around 240 persons). 
Finally, we have collected (imperfect) information about the cost efficiency of the 
municipalities’ nursing sector and their privatisation strategies. The efficiency score measures 
are collected from Erlandsen et al. (1997) and Edvardsen et al. (2000). They refer to two dif-
ferent points in time (1995 and 1997) and are based on detailed accounts of costs and output 
in the nursing sector of each municipality. The scores are computed by means of Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA), and, in short, a municipality is considered to be fully efficient in the 
year under consideration if no convex combination of other municipalities exists that pro-
duces more care services along all product dimension, without also using more of at least 
some inputs.  
Our privatisation indicator is collected from the so-called KOSTRA database (admin-
istered by Statistics Norway), and measures, for each municipality in Norway, the fraction of 
total social service expenditures that were allocated through private companies in 2003. Al-
though the year of measurement lies well outside our observation window, we believe that 
this summary measure may provide some indication regarding the privatisation strategies that 
were pursued during the 1990’s, and, hence, the pace of organisational change. 
In addition to identifying the behavioural effects of organisational change, we also 
wish to examine the possible impact of labour market tightness on the nurses’ employment 
and absence behaviour. Since the nurses in our study typically have a very strong employment 
protection, we expect discipline effects related to changes in labour market tightness to be 
moderate, perhaps with an exception for nurses with relatively small part time jobs (who 
might be underemployed). Unfortunately, the standard local unemployment rates do not rep-  14
resent the employment opportunities of nurses very well. We have therefore computed 
monthly county-specific unemployment rates for nurses in Norway particularly for the current 
project, based on the whole population of certified nurses in Norway (not only the permanent 
contract nurses covered in our analysis). These unemployment rates cover all kinds of unem-
ployment registered at the employment offices. 
4  The Model: The Dynamics of Absence and Welfare Dependency  
In this section, we set up a competing risks hazard rate model, aimed at uncovering the causal 
effects of organisational change on the propensity to become and remain absent, and to be-
come dependent on Social Security transfers on a more lasting basis. The model is set up in 
terms of monthly transition probabilities between various labour market states, conditioned on 
vectors of observed and unobserved explanatory variables. Let t=1,2,…,97 be the 97 months 
for which we can (potentially) observe labour market states, where t=1 is the first month (Oc-
tober 1992). The transition probabilities are assumed to depend on six groups of covariates; i) 
calendar time (t); ii) individual and environmental characteristics (xit); iii) municipality/county 
characteristics (mit); iv) workplace characteristics (zit); v) duration of an ongoing sickness ab-
sence spell  (dit); and vi) unobserved individual (time-invariant) characteristics (vi).  
  The first part of this model is the initial condition equation. Given that we have sam-
pled nurses who were employed (and not on maternity leave) in the first month, there are only 
two possible states to begin with; they are either present at work or absent, due to sickness. 
Let l(a)  be a probability function, and let y0i be an indicator variable taking the value 1 if in-
dividual i was absent from work (due to sickness) by the end of October 1992, and 2 other-
wise. We then write the initial condition equation as 
  ( )
'' '
01 0 1 0 1 0 0 (1 ) ii i prob y l x m z v βα δ == + + + . (1) 
In subsequent months (t>1), transitions can be made to the following destinations:   15
Destination 1: Sickness absence (conditional on work presence in previous month) 
Destination 2: Resumption of work (conditional on absence in the previous month) 
Destination 3: A new job  
Destination 4: Benefit claimant (unemployment, rehabilitation, disability). 
Destination 5: Outside the labour force without benefits. 
 
  Individuals are included in the dataset as long as they have a job within the sectors for 
which we have data and do not claim Social Security benefits (other than for sickness ab-
sence). This implies that a transition to destinations 4 or 5 terminates the event history for that 
individual. A transition to destination 3 may also terminate the event history, but only if the 
new job is taken outside the workplaces covered by our longitudinal data. As long as the event 
history continues, the nurses are either present at work or absent due to sickness. According to 
the Norwegian legislation, sickness absence cannot last longer than 12 months; hence, at this 
point some kind of transition must take place. We assume that individuals can make transi-
tions to new jobs and decide to leave the labour force (destinations 3, 4, and 5) regardless of 
whether they are currently sick or not. But sickness absence, and its duration, may have causal 
effects on the probability of making these transitions. These effects are modelled by means of 
a timing-of-events approach (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003a; Gaure et al., 2005), implying 
that we do not need exclusion restrictions in order to identify the causal effects of interest. A 
work spell is treated as exogenously censored when a person dies or leaves the country, or 
gives birth to a child. It is reactivated when/if a person returns to a position at the covered 
workplaces.   
The hazard rates are specified in terms of Mixed Proportional continuous time Hazard 
rate model (MPH); see Abbring and Van den Berg (2003a; 2003b). The model is set up in 
terms of monthly integrated hazard rates  ( , ) kk i t i wv ϕ , where k=1,2,3,4,5 indicates the destina-
tion and wkit is the vector of all observed variables relevant for individual i with respect to 
transition k in month t. We can then write the integrated hazards in the following way:   16
 













Note that  kt σ and  kd λ are calendar time and duration parameters, represented in the empirical 
model by separate dummy variables, one for each calendar month, and one for each possible 
sickness absence duration. 
 Let  1 kit y = if month t involved a transition to state k for individual i, and 0 otherwise. 
We can then write the likelihood contribution formed by individual i, conditional on all ob-
served covariates ( ) i w and on the six-dimensional vector of unobserved variables 
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where Ni is the full set of observations available for individual i (apart from the initial condi-
tion),  { } 2,3,4,5 it K = for individuals absent from work due to sickness and  { } 1,3, 4,5 it K =  for 
individuals present at work. Since the likelihood contribution in (3) contains unobserved vari-
ables, it cannot be used directly for estimation purposes. We approximate the unobserved joint 
heterogeneity distribution in a non-parametric fashion with the aid of a discrete distribution. 
Let  Q be the (a priori unknown) number of support points in this distribution and let 
{ } , , 1,2,... , ll vp l Q =  be the associated location vectors and probabilities. In terms of observed 
variables, the likelihood function is then given as    17
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In order to estimate the model, we also have to specify a functional form for the initial condi-
tion probability function l(a). In order to make it directly comparable to the other elements of 
the likelihood function, we specify it as a complementary log-log function, i.e., 
( ) 1 exp( exp( )) la a =− − . Our estimation procedure is to maximise the likelihood function in 
(4) with respect to all the model and heterogeneity parameters repeatedly for alternative val-
ues of Q. The non-parametric maximum likelihood estimators (NPMLE) are obtained by start-
ing out with Q=1, and then expand the model with new support points until the model is 
‘saturated’ in the sense that it is no longer possible to increase the likelihood function by add-
ing more points (Lindsay, 1983; Heckman and Singer, 1984). In practice, it has been demon-
strated by Gaure et al. (2005) that the usage of an information criterion (with a weak punish-
ment for parameter abundance) may reduce computational costs substantially, without reduc-
ing the quality of the estimates to any noticeable extent. In the present paper we use the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for model selection. At each stage of the estimation proc-
ess, we examine the appropriateness of an additional mass-point by means of simulated an-
nealing (Goffe et al., 1994).
6 Monte Carlo evidence presented in Gaure et al. (2005) indicates 
that the parameter estimates obtained in this way are consistent, that they are normally dis-
tributed, and that the standard errors conditional on the optimal number of support points also 
are valid for NPMLE. 
  A full list of our observed explanatory variables is provided in Table 2. In total, the 
model contains 228 explanatory variables. An important point to bear in mind is that the pa-
rameters do not necessarily have a purely causal interpretation. The main reason for this is 
                                                 
6 Localisation of the non-parametric maximum-likelihood estimators is an enormous computational 
task, and it could not have been done without extensive support from the High-Performance Computing Centre 
of the University of Oslo. Our optimisation algorithm is described in detail in Gaure et al. (2005).   18
that the employees’ health condition is unaccounted for in the model (since it is intrinsically 
unobserved), and that many of our explanatory variables may be correlated to this ‘omitted’ 
factor. For example, the education/position variable not only captures the causal effect of se-
lecting one education/position rather than another, but also the systematic difference in health 
status that correlates with this choice.  
- Table 2 around here - 
  In order to interpret the estimation results that we present in the next section, note that 
exp(parameter×variable) enters into the various hazard functions as proportionality terms. 
This implies that that the exponential function of a parameter attached to a dummy variable 
measures the hazard rate for an observation with the corresponding dummy equal to 1, rela-
tive to an individual belonging to the reference group (with the appropriate dummy variables 
set to zero), ceteris paribus. The substantive significance of a given relative change obviously 
depends on the level of the hazard to start with. To facilitate correct interpretation of our esti-
mation results, we therefore present in Table 3 an overview of the monthly transition rates 
actually observed in the data.  
- Table 3 around here - 
  The model we estimated ended up with as much as 24 support points in the discrete 
joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
7 All the results are robust towards the exact 
number of support points. In fact, there were only marginal changes in parameter estimates 
after the inclusion of 9-10 points (except in the heterogeneity distribution itself).  In total, the 
estimated model contains 1,359 estimated parameters. 
                                                 
7 This is a much higher number than what has previously been reported in the NPMLE literature; see 
Gaure et al. (2005), and references therein. However, we know of no previous attempts to estimate a six-
dimensional heterogeneity distribution by means of a fully nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator.   19
5  Results 
Selected estimation results are presented in Table 4. A key result, see part I of the table, is that 
large downsizing at a workplace not only causes a large (but trivial) increase in probability of 
making a job-to-job transition, as excess workers are channelled into other jobs in the munici-
pality/county, but also raises the probability of becoming absent due to sickness, to become 
dependent on other welfare transfers and/or to pull out of the labour force. In particular, com-
pared to a stable environment, a downsizing exceeding 20 per cent of the man-years at a 
workplace is associated with a small, but statistically significant rise in sickness absence, in 
the form of a 1-11 per cent increase in the hazard into sickness absence (95 per cent confi-
dence interval) and a 7-20 per cent decline in the hazard out of sickness absence. The adverse 
health effects are probably somewhat larger than suggested by these numbers, since downsiz-
ing also entails a discipline effect tending to reduce sickness absence for any given health 
condition. Despite strong employment protection, downsizing implies that some nurses may 
be forced to accept inferior jobs; hence, we would expect disciplinary effects to be present. 
Our results indicate that the adverse health effects dominate the disciplinary effects. This find-
ing is in line with previous results reported for Finnish municipalities (Vahtera et al. 2004); 
see Section 2. The effects of large downsizing on the hazard into other forms of welfare de-
pendency and on unsubsidised exits from the labour force are much larger in proportional 
terms than the effects on sickness absence, though from a lower base, conf. the average transi-
tion rates in Table 3. A downsizing exceeding 20 per cent of the employees yields a 23-64 per 
cent increase in the hazard to more lasting Social Security dependence, and a 29-79 per cent 
increase in the hazard to unsubsidised non-employment (95 per cent confidence intervals). 
More moderate downsizing incidences (10-20 per cent of the man-years) do not seem 
to affect sickness absence at all; they do, however, increase the hazard to ‘other benefits’ by 
7-30 per cent and to ‘non-employment without benefits’ by 21-46 per cent. Even more minor   20
downsizing incidences (0-10 per cent of the man-years) have no significant effects at all, ex-
cept its trivial impact on the hazard to a new job. 
- Table 4 around here - 
  Parameter estimates measuring the proportional impact on the various hazard rates are 
not easily combined into a convenient summary measure. Hence, to assess the substantive 
significance of the estimated downsizing effects, we provide a simple simulation exercise; 
i.e., we use the estimated model (the point estimates) to simulate event histories, based on ob-
served individual characteristics in October 1992 and drawings from the estimated distribu-
tion of unobserved heterogeneity. These simulations are produced under alternative assump-
tions regarding downsizing incidences. Since there are some events (such as pregnancy and 
maternity leave) and developments in time varying covariates that are treated as exogenous in 
the model, the simulations cannot reproduce the real data perfectly.
8 Moreover, the model 
does not account for the nurses’ return to work after exits to other benefit or non-employment. 
In the simulation exercise, we therefore assume that all nurses, who have exited to any of 
these two states, return to work at rates corresponding to the observed averages (by destina-
tion and by duration since exit) in the real data.  Figure 3 illustrates the simulated impact of a 
one-year downsizing process for an ‘average’ nurse; i.e., we compare the overall frequencies 
of welfare dependency in a situation with no downsizing at all (stable employment in all peri-
ods) with a situation characterised by a 20 per cent downsizing from October 1992 to October 
1993, and stable employment thereafter.
9 The immediate effect of downsizing is to raise the 
level of sickness absence by approximately 10 per cent (a half percentage point). During the 
one-year downsizing process, this effect doubles to approximately 20 per cent (1 percentage 
                                                 
8 We are also unable to identify the new employer in cases of simulated job-to-job transitions. In the 
simulation we therefore assume that a job-to-job transition does not change the vector of employer characteris-
tics (in essence, such transitions are disregarded). 
9 The presented results are actually averages taken over 10 complete simulations, hence there is little 
stochastic uncertainty in the simulations.   21
point). But, as can be seen from Figure 3, the higher rate of Social Security dependence in the 
downsizing simulation persists long after the downsizing process itself is completed, and it 
takes approximately six years before the effects are entirely exhausted. The reason for this is 
that the higher fraction of nurses on sick leave during the downsizing process subsequently 
causes more nurses to enter into more lasting forms of Social Security dependence as well 
(there are, by assumption, no direct lagged individual effects of downsizing). An alternative 
way of viewing the simulation results is to note that without any downsizing, the Social Secu-
rity system would, on average, have to pay for around 6.1 per cent of the man-years during 
the first year of our data-period. In the downsizing regime, this number would increase to 7.2, 
implying that the direct externality cost corresponds to 1.1 per cent of a man-year (or 18 per 
cent of the initial Social Security costs). These numbers may not appear worryingly large. 
However, if we also include the lagged (dynamic) effects for the subsequent years, the cost 
increases to around 3.1 per cent of a man-year per affected employee (or around 50 per cent 
of the initial yearly Social Security costs). Moreover, if we also include lost work due to the 
increased level of withdrawals from the labour force (not shown in the figure), the total cost 
increases to around 5.8 per cent of a man-year.  
- Figure 3 around here - 
These calculations are of course partial, in the sense that all other explanatory vari-
ables are kept constant. In practice, downsizing often goes hand in hand with other types of 
organisational change. We now take a brief look at the effects of other ‘pressure indicators’, 
with reference to estimates and standard errors reported in Table 4, part I. Institutions that 
have been through a period of significant staff reshuffling (more than 15 per cent turnover) 
have somewhat higher hazard rates to both sickness absence and other types of benefits, than 
more stable institutions. A high level of privatisation in a municipality’s social services (by 
2003) and a high efficiency score for its care sector (see Section 3) seems to be associated   22
with higher hazard rates into sickness absence, even conditioned on downsizing and turnover, 
although the efficiency score parameters are not individually significant at the 5 per cent 
level. The variables capturing economic vigour in the municipality/county (see Table 2) have 
generally small and statistically insignificant effects, and these are therefore not reported. In-
terestingly, the only exception from this pattern is the exogenous windfall gain dummy vari-
able (identifying municipalities with large rents from hydro power stations), which stands out 
with a significantly negative effect on the Social Security dependency hazard.   
The introduction of the pay-per-treatment reform in the hospital sector did apparently 
not affect the hazards into sickness absence or work resumption, but it quite significantly 
raised the hazards to Social Security dependence and unsubsidised withdrawals from the la-
bour force, while it reduced the hazard rate into other jobs. Together, these findings suggest 
that the reform did not imply impaired job opportunities in general, but that it nevertheless 
pushed some workers out of their jobs, partly on the Social Security Administration’s account.    
Local unemployment among nurses has the expected effects of reducing the hazard 
rates into sickness absence and increasing the hazard rates into Social Security dependence, 
particularly for fulltime nurses; see part II of Table 4. The former of these effects is weak, 
however, and it is somewhat surprising that it seems to be largest for nurses in fulltime posi-
tion (who have the strongest protection against underemployment). This may suggest that the 
unemployment effect on sickness absence for this group of workers is not primarily a disci-
pline effect, but rather a workload (stress) effect, reflecting that very low unemployment 
among nurses implies a shortage of qualified labour in some institutions.  
The hazard rates depend strongly on the current state (present or absent) and on the 
duration of an ongoing sickness spell. This is illustrated for a typical nurse (defined such that 
the transition rates after one month of sickness matches the corresponding data frequencies) in 
Figure 4.  The work resumption hazard displays significant negative duration dependence un-  23
til approximately nine months of sickness absence. However, as the moment of benefit ex-
haustion (after 12 months) approaches, there is a substantial increase in the work resumption 
hazard, leaving little doubt that economic incentives matter. The transition rate to other types 
of benefits is almost negligible for nurses present at work and during most of a sickness ab-
sence spell as well. This illustrates that the typical path into long-lasting Social Security de-
pendence goes through a one-year period of sickness absence. 
- Figure 4 around here - 
We do not discuss the results regarding the impact of individual and job characteristics 
in any detail. But, it is clear from the estimates reported in part III of Table 4 that there are 
large differences in individual hazard rates according to education and job type. A point to 
note is that the lower position an individual has in the work hierarchy, the higher are the sick-
ness absence and benefit hazards, and the lower is the work resumption hazard. Although 
there clearly exist several interpretations of this relationship, the finding is in accordance with 
a substantial body of medical research that has identified a strong social gradient in individu-
als’ health status (see Marmot, 2004, for a recent survey). Enrolled nurses are more absent 
than ordinary trained nurses who are more absent than specialised nurses. Nurses in nursing 
homes are much more absent than nurses in hospitals. There are also large differences in haz-
ard rates according to gender, family situation, and age (not shown). Parents with small chil-
dren, particularly lone parents, have high hazard rates into sickness absence. Unsurprisingly, 
pregnant women also have high hazard rates into sickness absence, and the hazard increases 
strongly as the birth comes closer (not shown). More interestingly, we find that the impact of 
pregnancy on the sickness absence hazard rate has increased significantly over time, suggest-
ing either that it has become more difficult to be present at work with minor health problems,   24
or that the threshold for claiming benefits has been lowered due to changes in social norms 
(Lindbäck, 1995a; 1995b).
10   
The estimated discrete heterogeneity distribution has no direct convenient interpreta-
tion. However, Monte Carlo evidence reported by Gaure et al. (2005) suggests that the first 
and second order moments are consistently estimated (although with large and unknown un-
certainty). The correlation coefficients may be of some interest, since they characterise the 
unobserved selection process into the various states. The correlation coefficients that can be 
derived from our multivariate 24-point distribution are presented in Table 5, and indicate, e.g., 
that individuals with a high unobserved absence propensity also have high non-employment 
propensities and low work-resumption propensities. It may be noted that the sign of the corre-
lation coefficients were robust with respect to the exact number of support points in the het-
erogeneity distribution. 
- Table 5 around here - 
6  Policy Implications 
The finding that organisational changes have adverse consequences in terms of withdrawals 
from the labour force and increased welfare dependency does of course not imply that they 
should not be implemented. The benefits of change, in terms of more cost-effective usage of 
resources, may outweigh the costs associated with, e.g., a higher level of sickness absence. 
However, the costs’ failure to show up in the accounts of the reorganising institutions may in 
some cases have been decisive for the decision to implement the changes. A possible policy 
response towards this externality is to internalise it, by requiring employers to pay some of the 
costs associated with Social Security benefits, either directly or through some kind of experi-
                                                 
10 Note that our estimated effect does not result from the increase over time in the average age at time of 
birth; on the contrary, when we include an interaction term of age and pregnancy in the model, it turns out that 
the effect of pregnancy declines significantly with age. This may be interpreted as supporting evidence for the 
norms-hypothesis, since new social norms are likely to enter through new cohorts.   25
ence rating. However, this would clearly reduce the firms’ incentives to hire individuals with 
poor health in the first place, and hence undermine attempts to make the labour market acces-
sible to all individuals (which have also been given very high priority by Norwegian authori-
ties). A second response is to cut sickness benefits. But a possible side effect of lower benefits 
is to foster a sickness presenteeism externality, since sick nurses may not take fully into ac-
count the damage they inflict on other workers or patients if they show up on the workplace 
with infectious diseases, or with diseases that seriously reduce the quality of their work (Chat-
terji and Tilley, 2002).  
The issue of health-cost externalities may be particularly acute within public sector in-
stitutions that are under pressure to cut expenditures, such as the health care and nursing insti-
tutions analysed in this paper. First, the total workload facing the employees in these institu-
tions may be more or less given in the short run, implying that less manpower is translated 
directly into a higher pressure on the nurses who survive the downsizing process. Previous 
evidence (Greenglass and Burke, 2001) indicates that a nurse’s individual workload is the 
most significant and consistent predictor of distress during restructuring processes in hospi-
tals. Second, the institutional combination of strong employment protection and compressed 
wages that prevails within the public sector in Norway, imply that workers considered (by the 
management) to have low productivity (who would have faced a high risk of layoff as a result 
of a downsizing process in a less regulated market) come under a very strong pressure to im-
prove their performance. If they are not able or willing to do so, they may even be persuaded 
to quit voluntarily, or to claim sickness or disability benefits; hence, the strong employment 
protection may promote exits through a ‘sickness route’ as a sort of substitute for exits   26
through the ‘unemployment route’. A sufficiently long period of sickness absence may even 
imply that the employment protection is lifted.
11  
The main policy implication arising from our findings is that cost-minimisation at 
each institution may not be the appropriate strategy towards minimising overall social or pub-
lic costs. In particular, more gradual changes, which do not force workplaces to downsize be-
yond their means (which are fairly limited, given the level of employment protection in the 
public sector), may be preferred over more drastic measures, even when they are less cost-
effective from each public institution’s point of view. A point to note is that we have found no 
evidence that more gradual downsizing processes (affecting less than 10 per cent of the man-
years per year) entail increased risks of sickness absence or exit from the labour market.  
Although we have focused on the presence of cost externalities in our discussion of 
the estimation results, it should be kept in mind that sickness absence also entails large direct 
costs for the institutions themselves; both because they have to pay for the first 16 days of ab-
sence, and because there are administrative costs associated with obtaining and training quali-
fied substitutes. If the causal relationship between organisational change and sickness absence 
is not fully understood, this may increase the likelihood that cost-inefficient changes are im-
plemented, particularly when institutions are under pressure to cut costs in the short run. 
Hence, scientific knowledge regarding this relationship should be valuable for employers, as 
well as for policy makers.  
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have traced the employment and benefit paths of nurses in Norway during 
the period from 1992 to 2000 (given that they were employed at the start of this period), and 
                                                 
11 Workers in Norway are legally protected against dismissals during the first 6 or 12 months of their 
sickness spell, depending on their seniority within the firm. After that, continued work incapacity may be con-
sidered a just cause for dismissal.   27
investigated the extent to which institution-specific events, such as downsizing of the work-
force, have affected their propensity to claim Social Security benefits and/or leave the labour 
force. Our results provide evidence that large downsizing of the workforce causes statistically 
significant increases in the employees’ non-employment rates as well as in their propensity to 
claim sickness and other health related benefits, even when layoffs are not used as part of the 
downsizing strategy. Downsizing yields higher hazard rates to sickness absence, and lower 
hazard rates back to work, once a sickness spell has started. It also yields higher hazard rates 
from sickness absence into more long-lasting Social Security dependency, and a higher hazard 
rate from employment to non-employment (without benefits).  
According to our point estimates, a single episode of workplace downsizing exceeding 
20 per cent of the man-years, on average bring about increased Social Security costs corre-
sponding to around 3.1 per cent of the man-years at that workplace (prior to the downsizing). 
Whether this number is of substantive significance clearly depends on the overall cost-
effectiveness of the many downsizing processes that have been implemented in the Norwe-
gian health care and social services sector. To the extent that they were only marginally cost-
effective from the institutions’ viewpoint, the unaccounted for Social Security costs may have 
been decisive for their implementation. Although the causal effects estimated in this paper are 
derived from a very flexible statistical model, they are likely to conceal substantial heteroge-
neity; while some reorganisation processes probably are implemented without adverse (or 
even with favourable) health consequences, others may involve much larger adverse effects 
than our estimates suggest. It is of course also important to bear in mind that economic deci-
sions embodying the power to raise the level of sickness absence and disability among em-
ployees, may involve human costs that (by far) exceed the payments from the Social Security 
system.    28
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Figure 1. Sickness absence, unemployment, turnover, and downsizing in Norway 1993-2003 
Sources:  Absence data: the Norwegian Social Security Administration (Rikstrygdeverket); unemployment 
data:  OECD; turnover data: based on micro-data used in Dale-Olsen (2005), and kindly provided us by the 
author; downsizing data: based on micro data collected by Statistics Norway, and kindly provided us by Morten 
Henningsen (these data may be subject to future revision). 
 










Figure 2. Per cent of nurses (employed in October 1992) receiving some kind of public in-
come support (including sickness benefits) October 1992-October 2000. 
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Downsizing from 1992 to 1993, otherwise no downsizing
 
Figure 3. Simulated average Social Security dependency rates with and without an initial 
downsizing period (lasting from October 1992 to October 1993), and stability thereafter. 
Note: Social Security dependency includes sickness benefits, rehabilitation benefits, disability benefits, social 
assistance, and unemployment benefits.  
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Figure 4. Estimated transition probabilities, normalised such that the transition probabilities in 
the first sickness month correspond to the observed averages (with 95 per cent point-wise 
confidence intervals).  
Note: Confidence intervals reflect statistical uncertainty in each of the two hazard rates separately.   35
 
Table 1 
Population Under Study. Descriptive Statistics. 





(Nurse’s aid)  
in 1992 








Number of individuals   43,167  9,905      12,112  6,412  14,868 
Mean age in 1992 (years)  38.0  30.0  42.6       30.0  43.1 
Females  (%)  95.4 93.1 94.6  96.4  97.2        
       
I. Status by the end of October 1992:       
Mean number of contracted working hours 
relative to full time position (%) 
74.2 79.1 77.9 66.7 71.2 
Working in hospital (%)  42.0         64.3         58.9  14.8  25.3        
Working in nursing home (%)  35.8  17.5         21.6         59.1  49.4 
Working in psychiatric institution (%)  6.2          4.5          6.1  6.9  7.2         
Working in community nursing (%)  16.0         13.7  13.4  19.2  18.3 
       
Absent due to parental leave  (%)  3.6  8.5  1.1  7.2  0.7 
Fraction of remaining workers absent due to 
long-term sickness (%)
* 
6.1          5.3  4.7  7.2  7.3 
       
II. Status by the end of October 2000       
Still working without income support, in the 
health-care and social service sector (%) 
81.0 81.1 83.4 79.9 79.6 
Out of which absent due to parental 
leave   (%) 
0.8 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 
Fraction of remaining workers absent 
due to long-term sickness (%)
* 
9.2 6.7 8.4 9.0  11.6 
Still working without income support, but in 
another sector of the economy (%) 
2.9 4.1 3.5 3.2 1.5 
Out of which absent due to parental 
leave   (%) 
0.8 1.5 0.0 1.9 0.0 
Fraction of remaining workers absent 
due to sickness (%)
* 
5.3 4.2 4.5 5.5 8.6 
       
Fully  disabled  (%)  3.4 0.6 2.9 1.7 6.4 
Partly disabled (%)  2.5  0.5  2.6  1.1  4.3 
Under  rehabilitation  (%)  2.9 1.9 2.1 4.5 3.6 
Unemployed  (%)  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Living on means tested social security (%)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Outside labour force without income support 
(%) 
5.5 9.8 3.7 8.1 2.9 
Not registered (dead or migrated to another 
country without benefits) (%) 
1.6 1.9 1.7 1.1 1.4 
       
Receiving some kind of Social Security 
benefit (including sickness benefits) (%) 
16.9 9.0 15.2  15.1  24.2 
       
*Long-term sickness is defined as having been absent from work for at least 16 working days. Shorter absence 
spells are not recorded in administrative registers, since they are not paid for by the Social Security system (but 
by the employer). 
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Table 2 
List of explanatory variables 
Variable  Functional form / number of variables 
I. Individual explanatory variables and 
environmental characteristics  (xit) 
 
Gender  One dummy variable 
Age  38 dummy variables (<24, 24, 25,…,60) 
Education/position  Four dummy variables (enrolled nurse, trained nurse, trained nurse 
with additional specialized education, trained nurse in administra-
tive position) 
Basic working time  Three dummy variables (less then 50%,  50-80%, >80%) 
Shift work  Three dummy variables (shift, not shift, unknown) 
County   18 dummy variables, one for each county 
Single parent  One dummy variable 
Children 0-6  One dummy for having children below six years 
Children 6-12  One dummy for having children between six and 12 
Pregnancy  Seven dummy variables (for 7,6,…,1 months left until birth, re-
spectively, plus one interaction term between a dummy for preg-
nancy and a linear time trend) 
G.P. reform  One dummy for nurses living in one of the four municipalities that 
were subject to a G.P. panel doctor reform during the estimation 
period 
Local unemployment rate for nurses  Three linear terms, one for each type of basic working time 
II. Employer (municipality/county) 
characteristics (mit) 
 
Debt by the end of last year, relative to 
total incomes that year 
Two linear terms, one for municipalities and one for counties 
Total income this year, relative to number 
of inhabitants above 67 years 
Three dummies for municipalities and three dummies for counties 
(low income, medium income and high income)  
Percentage change in tax and transfer in-
comes last year, relative to incomes the 
year before that 
Two linear terms, one for municipalities and one for counties 
Very rich municipality  One dummy for municipalities with pure rents from natural re-
sources above 10,000 NOK per inhabitant (“kraftkommuner”) 
Absolute majority of privatisation-friendly 
political parties(H and F) 
Two dummy variables (majority this period, majority this period, 
but not previous period) 
Urbanity  Three dummy variables for municipalities and three dummy vari-
ables for counties 
Small municipality  One dummy for municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants 
Efficiency score municipalities 1995/1997  Three dummy variables (fully efficient, medium efficiency, low 
efficiency). 1995-score is attributed to observations before 1997, 
and 1997-score thereafter. 
Degree of privatization in care sector, 2003  Three dummy variables (less than 1%, 1-20%, more than 20%) 
III. Workplace characteristics (zit)  
Type of workplace  Four dummy variables (nursing home, community nursing, psy-
chiatric institution, somatic hospital) 
Change in the number of man-years from 
last year to this year 
Six dummy variables (more than 20% reduction, 10-20% reduc-
tion, 0-10% reduction, 0-10% increase, 10-20% increase, more 
than 20% increase) 
Turnover from the year before last year to 
last year 
Three dummy variables (less than 5% turnover, 5-15% turnover, 
more than 15% turnover) 
Number of nursing man-years   Four linear terms, one for each type of workplace 
Pay-per-treatment in hospitals  One dummy, indicating that the employer workplace is currently 
part of the pay-per-treatment experiment 
IV. Calendar time   97 dummy variables, one for each calendar month 
V. Duration of sickness spells  13 dummy variables, one for not being absent due to sickness, and 
one for each possible ongoing duration (1,2,…,12)   37
 
Table 3 
Average observed monthly transition rates (per cent) 
 I  II  III  IV  V 











From job presence  2.48  -  0.66  0.12  0.20 
From sickness absence 
after 
     
 1 month absence  -  42.47  0.48  0.11  0.16 
6 months absence  -  13.87  0.68  0.34  0.29 
12 months absence**  -  29.28  0.94  33.54  0.25 
* Approximately 75 per cent of these transitions are to health-related (G.P. certified) benefits, such as rehabilita-
tion and disability benefits. The rest are mainly transitions to unemployment benefits. 
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Table 4 
Selected parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
  






















I. Workplace and employer character-
istics 
        
Changes in # man-labour years at work-
place from previous year 
        













































[0,10]%  increase  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 



























Turnover rate at workplace previous  year          
































Efficiency in the municipality’s care 
sector according to DEA analysis, see 
Section 3) 
        












          












Low  efficiency  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
          
Privatisation in municipality’s care sec-
tor in 2003 (% of total expenditures) 
        













1-20  %    Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
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II. Labour market tightness for nurses             
County unemployment × dummy for less 
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Table 4 
Selected parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
  






















County unemployment × dummy for 















          
III. Individual and job characteristics          
G e n d e r           

















Education          
Enrolled  nurse  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 




































Type  of  workplace            
Nursing  home  (municipality)  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 














































Working  time  pattern          



































≥  80%  Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
















Family  situation          

















































Change in effect of pregnancy from 
the beginning to the end of the obser-














Note: *(**) indicates significance at the 5(1) per cent level. 
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Table 5 
Correlation coefficients in the estimated unobserved heterogeneity distribution  
(exp( ),exp( )),  ki ji corr v v k j ≠  















sence in first 
month (vk0) 
To sickness absence (vk1) 
 
- -0.369  0.107  0.229  0.123  0.268 
To work resumption (vk2) 
 
 -  0.064  -0.224  -0.004  -0.178 
To a new job (vk3) 
 
  -  0.065  0.484  0.138 
To other benefit (vk4) 
 
   -  0.371  0.119 
To non-employment (vk5) 
 
     - 0.091 
 
 